agricultural research and the statistical evidence [Lipton 1985 ].
Three general statements can be made. Despite the path-breaking experiences in Asia of (say) the Punjabs, Sonora, and Central Luzon -and despite the African precedent, now 20 years old, of SR-52 hybrid maize -most of SSA now offers smaliholders no dramatic, immediately applicable new technology that might, with plausible increases in output/input price ratios, or in person/land ratios, safely and substantially increase the profitability of food farming over large areas. While this is so, the elasticity of total farm output to currently recommended policy changes, including price changes, can seldom be very large. More or better agricultural research (AR) is necessary, but seldom sufficient, to remedy this.
The AR policy issue can be addressed by seeking o explain a paradox. Rates of return to AR have been shown to be very large. By the standards of the developing world, SSA appears to be spending a good deal on AR (and to be supporting it with unusually high levels of extension).' Yet, by those same standards, agricultural growth in SSA, except for a few countries, has been notoriously slow. Moreover, SSA is unlike other parts of the world in that the success of a nation's agriculture does not seem to have been strongly linked to its level or growth-rate of AR outlay or scientist numbers.
There are two explanations. First, there is less AR in most of SSA than there seems to be. Second, even that 'less' is less good at producing output-oriented results
For es dence that outlay on extension generally increases the return to outlay -especially subsequent outlay -on research, see Evenson and Kisles, 1976 . On SSA's exceptionally high extensionresearch ratios, see Oram and Bindlish, 1981: 44, lOO; Evenson, 1975: 3-13 and especially Pinstrup-Andersen, 1982: 66-7. ¡/35 B,,//ri,n. 985, ol IS no 3. I lututeol Í)evolopntent Studie',. Sii', ', nx 14 in SSA than in most other poor countries. Many, probably most, SSA countries are paying for -and getting -much less AR than the crude numbers (dollars, scientific person-years) indicate.
An even more important explanation of the paradox lies in the nature of that research. One group of problems concerns critical mass. There seem to be scale-economies in research-station size, to well above the sizes achieved in most of SSA.2 Yet the difficulties of SSA countries, mostly poor and small, in attaining critical mass are aggravated by high turnover; by 'loss' of AR benefits to nearby countries without regional co-ordination; and by dispersion of scientists among stations and programmes.
This last problem arises partly out of efforts to solve a second group of problems, those of relevance of centralised AR to local conditions. Partly, this is due to lack of 'congruence' [Boyce and Evenson, 1975:83-98; Judd, Boyce and Evenson, 1983:23-8] between the output-mix and the research-mix, even allowing for different prospects of success in different types of work. Partly, it reflects inadequate integration of economic and social analysis into agricultural research. The overseas orientation of much SSA research cannot help either.
But the main reason why SSA agricultural research has not contributed more to output is the absence of a proper policy framework. This gap explains the truly appalling shortage of basic facts on farm output, especially smaliholder food output -and even, to some extent, about farm research. Is 'research policy', then, the key? In one sense, no: little will be achieved by persuading SSA countries to adopt a blueprint that centralises agricultural research upon a high-powered research institute or interdepartmental committee. In a second sense, again no: overall policy (on food strategies, nutrition and tncome-distribution, infor-A simple grain mill enhances productivity. mation systems, labour-intensity, irrigation and water management, and above all agriculture's share of real resources) is required, before research policy can help.
Yet, in a final sense, research policy is the key. It is possible to outline research contents, career structures, and priorities that -given adequate real indigenous resources and a roughly feasible agricultural policy will greatly increase the chances that those resources will achieve the output and distribution goals of the policy.
High AR Spending, Low Output Pay-off
The size of AR in SSA, compared to agricultural output and even agricultural production, seems to be quite large. In 1974, public-sector agricultural research expenditure was 1.12 per cent of agricultural output in western SSA, 1.63 per cent in eastern SSA, and about 1.45 per cent in southern SSA.3 Figures for other developing regions were substantially lower, e.g. 0.31 per cent in South Asia and 0.49 per cent in SE Ibid., p.46. The last figure includes RSA, but its ratio appears to be closer to I percent than to 1.5 per cent. Hence the ratio for southern SSA proper is even higher than 1.45 per cent.
Asia.4 Comparisons for 1980 are available for only a few LDCs. They show a similarly high-spending performance on SSA research, at each income level.
In 1975, 10 examples of direct cost-benefit analysis, and 11 sources-of-growth studies of national AR were collated. Internal rates of return in the former group ranged from 20 per cent (US poultry) to 60 per cent (Indian sugarcane) and 45-93 per cent (Mexico, various crops). The seven studies from developing countries showed somewhat higher returns than the studies from developed countries, and a parallel study 'estimated marginal internal rates of return of 42 per cent to technologically oriented research in developing countries and 21 per cent in developed countries' [Boyce and Evenson 1975:110, fn.] per scientist-year [Boyce and Evenson 1975:42] . Thus, 5The private sector contributes only 3 per cent of agricultural research outlays in developing Asia and Africa [Boyce and Evenson 1975: 77]. 6For example, in the eight 'SSA low-income countries' in Table I [Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal (sic So part of the explanation of the SSA agricultural paradox -high national AR outlay, slow agricultural growth, yet world-scale evidence of good agricultural returns to research -is that most of SSA is getting exceptionally little 'real' national research output per scientist, and paying heavily for each scientist: and this despite unusually high support from extension, and from international research systems. Since 'countries will respond to lower prices of national scientific resources. . . the issue of training scientists at low cost in national programs now deserves much greater attention from aid donors' [Judd el al., 1983:47] . Further, so-called 'national AR' in much of SSAdespite exceptions, such as Kenya -reflects foreign money, personnel, and intellectual commitment much more than in other developing regions.
Critical Mass and Local Relevance
Part of the reason why many African governments as opposed to aid donors -find AR unattractive is the group of problems associated with critical mass. World-wide, countries with below $400 of GDP per person in 1974 located 49 per cent of their scientists in experiment stations with over 21 persons; the proportion for better-off countries was 61 per cent [Boyce and Evenson 1975:83] . Poor communications within LDCs make the dispersion of scientists in SSA even more damaging to prospects of achieving a critical mass; so does the fact that, because fewer scientists are highly trained (and because technicians and administrators are scarce), much 'research' time in each station is diverted to technical and administrative duties.
Compared with South Asia, too, the small populations of most SSA countries -together with the fact that a typical such country combines agricultural diversity with linguistic specificity -aggravate the problem even further, Each small country's government must fear, rightly, that its own spending on research will produce mostly unrequited benefits for foreigners.
Regional research cooperation has its own costs, both 7Standardised publications are explained, and data gtven, in Boyce and Evenson 1975: 39-42 and 84-96. if nations fall out (as in East Africa) and if free-riding has to be policed. The need to incorporate several disciplines, socioeconomic as well as scientific, ifAR is to produce results that benefit smallholders also carries a double burden: it directly raises the required critical mass, and it does so indirectly by imposing, upon researchers, costs of communication to non-specialists. In these extremely difficult circumstances, there are two possible ways to ease the problem: to reduce staff turnover, or, to reduce the number of research stations. Clearly the second approach has drawbacks, so one would expect great concentration on the first.
One would be disppointed. Kenya is a particularly telling case, because both its AR and its medium-term agricultural growth have been well above the SSA norm [Taylor el al., 198l:v] [Taylor el al., 1981:80-81] .
If these career-based causes of high turnover apply even in Kenya, they apply much more forcibly in most of SSA, and are indeed richly documented in various ISNAR reports. Anyway, even where the causes of turnover from public AR are benign and where the recipient sectors benefit greatly, the problem of lost critical mass remains.
Moreover, high turnover among, and out of, publicsector AR stations is damagingly synergistic with the often large number of such stations. Ifwe remain with Kenya, 'research on priority [food] crops is undertaken principally in 42 national and regional sub-stations'; there are also separate commodity research stations for sugar, coffee (four), tea and cotton, and for livestock, animal health and forestry.
Many of these stations suffer personnel shortages [ibid.:32-3, 36-7, 54 [Gilbert el al. 1982:12-13,28 ].
There is a real case for improving regional representativeness by multiplying research stations; but it tends, in SSA, to reduce an already inadequate 'mass' at each station. An obvious idea is to create national stations located at the borders of two or more agroclimatic zones. Concentration of stations, however, risks even more exclusion of remote (and often very poor) areas, and even more submersion of rural research in urban priorities. -by very poor people. That would imply abovecongruent research/output9 ratios for these products, and below-congruent ratios for others, notably for estate-based export crops. tO
Research Biases: Domestic and International Do SSA commodity compositions of AR -allowing for distribution, for non-responsive commodities, for 'free' foreign reseach, and for the wish not to pass on research benefits to 'price-inelastic demanders' in rich countries -achieve a reasonable degree of relevanceby-congruence? Table I Despite the much greater reliance of most Asian agricultures on animal draught and integrated farming, it is in SSA that animal husbandry enjoys higher shares of AR [Oram and Bindlish 1981:541.11 The bias in national AR towards export crops [Pinstrup-Anderson 1982:64] and rich people's products, and away from congruence, is especially strong in SSA. Surely, the reasons are political, rather than the results of 'rational' attempts by a neutral state to maximise the yield on research revenues. But the for 'aid' support from their own governments and universities. As for African governments and universities, the way for a department to gain prestige and cash is to initiate new research projects dependent on fresh foreign skills -'to grow a cabbage, call an expert from the FAO' -rather than to build on, or in many cases to rescue, old projects due for 'indigenisation' of leadership posts.
Are these words too harsh? I know that African food production will not respond significantly to current price-policy fashions, nor to tomorrow's fashions either, without seed-water-fertiliser-based research breakthroughs, tested for safety and profitability in smallholder environments. I accept, too -given 'twenty years largely wasted' in the post-Independence agricultures of many (not all) SSA countries -that such breakthroughs cannot be achieved without foreign involvement. But throwing money and foreign experts at half-analysed research issues, to create overlapping and (in all senses) foreign research systems, is not the way to achieve such research to reduce the grotesque rural-urban gaps. Third the overriding need for poor people is to get per-person food availability rising somehow in a set of environments where it has been falling. In SSA, unlike South Asia, most poor people are directly farming for food, so that, unless stupid tractorisation policies are adopted, higher availability will accompany higher power to purchase food.
However, these points are not quite sufficient. HYVs' 'second-generation problems' arrive very fast, even in SSA, especially alongside growing labour gluts. For example, we are told that the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in Ethiopia 'rapidly expanded use of improved varieties of wheat and teff and of fertiliser by farmers participating in the project, with an approximate doubling of wheat yields' [Anthony et al. 1979: 256] . Indeed so; but it also encouraged the dispossession of tenants by large landlords, who then displaced labour with combine harvesters. The view that -in Kenya, for instance -subsistence-commercial 'dualism is gradually being transformed with the division of large farms in the high-potential areas into smaller commercial farms and the formation of a continuum from subsistence farming to highly commercialised large-scale farming' [Taylor et al. 1981: 4] is much too sanguine. Political and economic factors, alongside rising person/land ratios, can induce polarisation; and, even if there is a transition from bimodal to unimodal agricultures as Taylor and his colleagues predict, the result need not be less unequal, or better for the poor, if the variability of farm size (or net income) around the mean is very high in the unimodal situation.
It is notable that although the current Kenyan Plan's 'basic strategy for development. . . is the alleviation of poverty, throughout the nation', poverty-orientation played no part in the terms of reference for the report on its AR commissioned by the Government from ISNAR [Taylor et al. 1981 
